You're Not Being Reasonable!

I’m embarrassed to admit that I’ve been getting myself into more online arguments about politics and religion lately, and I’m not happy with either my own behavior or others. All the cognitive biases are on display, and hardly anyone actually speaks to the other side. Unreasonableness is rampant.

The problem is that what’s reasonable tends to be subjective. Obviously, I’m going to be biased toward thinking people who agree with me are more reasonable than those lunkheads who don’t. But that doesn’t mean there aren’t objective standards for being reasonable.

To find out what those standards are, I needed to compensate for my bias, so I identified three groups of people to study.

• I looked for people I agreed with whom I thought unreasonable

• I looked for people I disagreed with whom I thought were reasonable

• I looked for people arguing about stuff I didn’t care about and picked which ones sounded more reasonable

In addition, I looked at some of the classical standards for reason, and also reviewed some of the basic communications concepts we use in business.

I learned some of the following through observation, and most of it through the contrary experience of doing it wrong. You’ve heard some of the advice elsewhere, but a reminder every once in a while comes in handy.

1. You’re not being reasonable if you don’t construct your arguments using reason.

Classical argument operates by rules. There is a proper structure for proof. Some proofs are invalid, riddled with structural errors. Failure to follow the rules of reason is, by definition, unreasonable. A good description of classical rules for arguments and a list of common fallacies can be found here.

2. You’re not being reasonable if you don’t acknowledge your own biases and blind spots.

Before you deal with the mote in your brother’s eye, deal with the plank in your own. The problem with that advice is that it’s hard, by definition, to see a blind spot. Because some biases are universal, you can at least acknowledge that you have those.

Remember too that because a decision is biased doesn’t mean it’s automatically wrong. I have a bias toward trusting people. I don’t think that’s a fundamental error; it is, however, a risk. I don’t want to get rid of the bias; I simply want to be aware of it so I can correct my own observations.

3. You’re not being reasonable if you don’t take the time to find out what the other person really means.

If there’s a misunderstanding about what they mean, remember that it is they — not you — who are the official judge of that issue. It’s fair they should acknowledge that their initials statement may have been infelicitous, but they’re entitled to revise their thoughts for greater clarity and accuracy. You have to let the old phrasing go after they change it.

In addition, reasonable people take the time to find out why their arguments are rejected, and in the future either use a different argument or at least address the identified deficiency. If you keep repeating the same argument, and fail to adjust it when you find out other people aren’t buying it, eventually you stop being reasonable. (Trying an argument a few times to work out the kinks is completely different. A failed argument can be an opportunity to do a better job next time.)

4. You’re not being reasonable if you don’t take the time to figure out why the other side believes what they believe.

While it’s instructive to define what are our differences, it’s fundamental to probe the underlying reasons why we believe it. If the difference between us is a fundamental value, it’s not subject to contrary proof by logical argument. Acknowledge the difference, and move on to the next phase, which may be walking away or getting ready to rumble.

If, on the other hand, our fight is between which of two roads is the best way to our shared destination, there’s no need to get hostile about it. One or more of us might in fact be wrong, but all have the same desire.

5. You’re not being reasonable if you don’t separate emotional outbursts from logical reasoning.

If the matter is serious enough, emotions are going to break through. It’s not practical to regard such lapses as evidence of moral failure. What does constitute failure to be reasonable is failing to curb the outbursts before they get out of hand, and failing to apologize (or failing to accept an apology, even a grudging one) when you’ve stepped over the line of good manners.

Labeling an emotional outburst an emotional outburst helps, but doesn’t undo all the potential consequences, any more than labeling a bomb “BOMB” constitutes an acceptable safety program.

6. You’re not being reasonable if you only expose yourself to one type of information.

Always read at least one news source that strongly contradicts your worldview, and make sure you understand what they actually believe and why they believe it. If you have no idea why they think what they think in the first place, what makes you believe you can come up with a persuasive argument to change their minds?

7. You’re not being reasonable if you don’t acknowledge your mistakes and apologize generously.

Factual errors, misrepresentations of the other side’s opinions, violations of good manners — people who own up quickly and generously are considered a lot more reasonable than those who don’t.

An accusation that you’ve done something wrong isn’t automatically proof that you have done so. Or maybe you did and still believe you’re justified. If there’s doubt, a good judge is someone known to be reasonable who leans toward the other side. If that person thinks you’re out of line, maybe you should listen. If a reasonable person on the other side thinks you’re being reasonable, that’s a fairly encouraging sign.

If the situation’s mixed, you can apologize for your fair share (err on the side of generosity) without having to own all the blame. If the other person tries to shove it down your throat, understand that other reasonable people will be more inclined toward you if you don’t return the aggression.

8. You're not being reasonable if you don't separate what you know from what you believe.

You don't know it if you can't prove it by empirical, external means. Facts can generally be proved to the satisfaction of someone else. Beliefs aren't necessarily subject to the need for external proof, but you can't demand someone accept your belief the same way you can demand someone accept a demonstrable fact.

9. You’re not being reasonable if you don’t stay out of fights that aren’t any of your business.

‘Nuff said.

And yes, I’ve been guilty of violating many of these rules myself. Hypocrisie est un homage que la vice rend á la vertu.

Which rules of reasonableness have I missed?

Heads I Win, Tails I Win (and the Same to You)

Negotiation is such a fundamental “threshold” skill that it’s nearly impossible for you to succeed long-term without developing skills in this area.  Unfortunately, many people get the wrong idea about what negotiation is and how works.

The distaste that some people feel for the concept of negotiation results from seeing negotiation as “win/lose” (I win, you lose) or “lose/win” (I give up rather than make an enemy out of you) rather than “win/win” (we both come out of the negotiation with our needs met).  In addition to moral or ethical qualms, the reality is that we leave someone unhappy, and that person is unlikely to forget.  We will have to deal with the leftover negativity at some future time.  “Win/win” approaches aren’t just nice, they’re necessary for our long-term relationships and performance.

But how is it possible to negotiate and have both parties win?

Understanding “win/win”

Negotiation isn’t simply about compromise (let’s just split it 50-50).  While sometimes a compromise solution in which each party gives a little bit is acceptable, often a compromise turns into “lose/lose.”

Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project point out that in many negotiations the participants see a “fixed pie,” but that it’s often possible to “expand the pie.”

They tell the story of “the proverbial sisters who quarreled over an orange.  After they finally agreed to divide the orange in half, the first sister took her half, ate the fruit, and threw away the peel, while the other threw away the fruit and used the peel from her half in baking a cake.”

In other words, “common sense” would suggest the orange could only be split in such a way that the parts added up to 100%, but this particular orange could have been split 100-100, not 50-50...because the two sisters had different yet complementary interests!

The “win/win” concept of negotiation emphasizes that preserving the relationship is an important goal in most negotiations, and that’s particularly crucial when the other participant in negotiation happens to be your boss.  You might be able to force your desires through his or her resistance, but you have to expect him or her to remember that in the future.  “If you wrong us,” Shylock says, “shall we not revenge?”

Win/win isn’t only ethically superior, it’s more practical as well.

“Hard” vs. “soft” styles

You can make a lifetime study of negotiation, and it will benefit you in every area of your life.  It’s worth adding to your list of areas for personal and professional development, because you will ultimately find yourself in continual negotiation situations.  Negotiation styles are sometimes divided into “soft” and “hard,” but that’s not a very meaningful distinction.

The Fisher/Ury Getting to Yes techniques are sometimes referred to as “soft” because they involve collegiality and teamwork.  But even in a “hard” negotiation program such as Roger Dawson’s excellent The Secrets of Power Negotiating, you’ll find his commitment to “win/win” negotiation, “a) Never narrow negotiations down to just one issue.  b) Different people want different things.”




Some key principles of win/win negotiation


As you study negotiation skills, you’ll find that different authorities have certain specific detailed and tactical suggestions.  However, some general principles of effective negotiation are common to the various styles and strategies.

1. Do your homework.

Before negotiating anything with anybody, there are a couple of things you should do.
First, analyze your own goal, making sure that you focus on your interests (the reasons you want what you want) instead of only your positions (the specifics for which you’re asking.  The position of the sisters was that each wanted the orange.  To find the underlying interests, you focus on why.  Why do you want the orange?  What exactly would you do with it if you had it all?  What would not be useful or necessary for you?

Second, determine your bottom line.  What do you need--and what is the best you can do assuming that the negotiation goes nowhere?  You need to know this so you’ll know when you’re getting results...and so you won’t take an offer that’s less than what you’d get if there is no deal.  Fisher and Ury call this your “BATNA”:  your “best alternative to a negotiated agreement.”   Roger Dawson calls it “walk-away power.”

Third, put yourself in the shoes of the other person and do the same thing.  The more you understand the interests and goals of the other participant--and their own BATNA or walk-away options, the easier you’ll find it to locate win/win options.

2. Listen—for the real issues.

Being a good listener is a valuable negotiation technique for several reasons.  First, your understanding of the other person grows, which helps you in working toward the best outcome.  Second, when you listen, you automatically validate the other person, lowering their stress and emotions, and create a climate in which better results can occur.  Paraphrase what you’re being told to make sure you understand it fully.

3. Be persistent and patient.

You want to negotiate in order to achieve results for both parties.  Surrendering and giving in are examples of lose/win, not win/win strategies.  Keep your dignity and your personal strength intact by refusing to yield to hardball tactics and pressure.  One reason to study such tactics yourself is that it becomes easier to counter them in practice.

Being in a hurry to reach a deal often gives you a worse deal than you’d get with patience.  If a particular round of negotiation isn’t panning out successfully, maybe it’s time to walk away for now, think about what you’ve learned, and try again later.

4. Be clear and assertive.

You’ve heard it said, “If you don’t ask, you don’t get.”  That’s true even in cases where the other person isn’t necessarily hostile or negative to your interests.  If you don’t ask, there is a good chance the other person doesn’t even know what it is you want--and if he or she doesn’t know, how can you expect him or her to read your mind?  One of the most interesting elements of preparing well for a negotiation is how often you get your needs met without actually encountering the resistance you expected!


5. Allow face-saving.

When a negotiation or conflict situation ends up making one person be “in the wrong,” don’t be surprised if that person feels negative about it.  Being embarrassed or humiliated is not a positive emotion.  When you must show your boss that he or she is incorrect, or has made a mistake, or has make a bad decision, you not only have to get the situation corrected, you have to resolve the emotional issues in a way to allow your boss to “save face.”

Some techniques for face-saving include the “third party appeal,” in which you don’t say, “I’m right, you’re wrong,” but instead find a neutral third party (such as a reference book) that you’ll use to resolve the issue.  Another valuable technique is privacy.  It’s easier to admit to one person that one is wrong than admit it publicly to everyone.  (And never gloat afterward!)  A third is to find a way to allow the person to be partially right, or to allow yourself to be partially wrong.  (At least you can always allow for the possibility of improvement.)

You negotiate every day of your life and with all the people in your life.  Don’t wait until you are in a major conflict situation with the power dynamic stacked against you to develop this skill.



From Managing UP: 59 Ways to Build a Career-Advancing Relationship With Your Boss, by Michael and Deborah Singer Dobson (AMACOM, 2000). Copyright © 2000 Michael and Deborah Dobson. All Rights Reserved.

Dobson's Laws (Part 1)

I've been practicing my skills as an aphorist through daily tweets since last August, and I'm grateful for the many insightful responses I've received here, on Twitter, and on Facebook. Herewith a collection of the first 123 of Dobson's Laws, presented in two parts.

Dobson's Laws are copyright © 2010 by Michael Dobson under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license.

Career Management and Personal Growth

Your strength in one situation can be a weakness elsewhere. You must know when you're operating out of your vulnerabilities and biases.

Never say it can't be done in a first meeting, no matter how sure you are. People tend to think you aren't even trying.

Sweat key small stuff. There's often something that makes the customer disproportionately happy, and you can always use more good will.

There is no situation so bad that you cannot make it worse.

Your attitude changes the world around you. If you look at the world through rose-colored glasses, it's amazing how often you get roses.

Research shows pessimists see the world more clearly than optimists, but optimists make more money and live longer. Take your pick.

Things are what they are, but that doesn't make you helpless. The world is filled with both opportunity and danger.

Failure can sometimes be turned into success. If Pisa's tower didn't lean, no one would visit it.

Fight the temptation to take on interesting projects that exceed your performance bandwidth.

If you age your work properly, lots of it will turn out to be unnecessary or irrelevant. This is the great secret of time management.

Most of us are not-so-good Samaritans. But being a good neighbor is in your best interest, too. Someday you might be the one in the ditch.

How often do you describe your workplace as a war zone? Taking flak, being shot down, or out for blood...pay attention to violent metaphors.

Faking can be dishonest, but it can also be a form of practice. I've faked liking people so long that now I actually do.

We correlate age with wisdom, but that's wrong. Age provides experience; wisdom is learning from it.

Communications, Cognitive Bias, Perception, Influence

Realism isn't cynicism. A cynic is disappointed that things are what they are. Realists accept the facts and go from there.

When people rate their own decisions as "95% certain," research shows they're wrong approximately 40% of the time.

You have three kinds of blind spots: ones you don't know you have, ones you embrace or accept, and ones you try to overcome.

The fundamental flaw of almost all management thinking is the assumption that we are all rational.

You want someone to know something, to do something, or to feel something - there are no other reasons to communicate.

In English, gratitude and ingratitude are opposites, but flammable and inflammable are synonyms. Language is a leading cause of fires.

When there aren't standards for empirical proof, our common ground turns into scorched earth.

Telling people it's going to be OK often influences the likelihood it will be. That's not lying; it's premature truth-telling.

The customer is always right only at the end of the project, when they decide if they're happy and want to pay you.

Say back to them what they said to you before arguing. Until they hear their words in your mouth, they don't believe you listened.

A customer only needs two qualifications: a need, and the wherewithal to pay for it. You have to figure out the rest and then supply it.

Every communications medium has some special virtue nothing else can replace. After 6,000 years, we still chisel some messages into stone.

In the South, an honest politician is one who stays bought. But real politicians are always dependable. Their word is their stock in trade.

Seminars on dealing with difficult people are mostly filled with difficult people. Try looking in the mirror.

Jokes reveal pain and offer insight. Read the cartoons people tape to cubicle walls. They're often cries for help.

Creative Thinking, Problem Solving, Decision-Making

What do you know now that you wish you had known earlier? You can't replay the past, but the lesson might be useful in the future?

Failure is essential to all creative endeavors. Learn to fail early, fail often, and fail cheaply.

What's half of thirteen? A mathematician would say 6.5, but a graphic designer might say "thir" or "teen." The answer depends on the goal.

There's always a question that will illuminate key problems if asked early enough. Try on lots of questions to find the right one.

Fortunately, doing the right thing and the smart thing are usually the same thing. Ethics and self-interest often go hand-in-hand.

An often overlooked way to overcome procrastination: delegation. Is there some way you can get someone else to do it for you?

You are not there to do what the customer (or your boss) says. You're there to do what your he or she *wants.* They aren't always identical.

Real life seldom conforms to the clean, crisp edges of a model. Models are useful, but don't confuse the map with the territory.

Always identify the "good enough" point, even if you don't settle for it. How can you exceed expectations if you don't know what they are?

There are two ways to learn from experience: Have an experience, learn. Or find someone else who's had the experience and learn from that.

SideWise Thinkers know that reality is nuanced and complex. Beware the person who claims to explain it all in 140 characters.

"Known knowns, known unknowns, unknown unknowns." Rumsfeld missed one: unknown knowns, things to which our perceptual biases blind us.

You don't procrastinate because you're a "procrastinator," you procrastinate for a reason. Knowing why is essential to overcoming the block.

Creativity trainers mostly teach you how to generate ideas. Useful, but inspiration's only 1%. The rest (the hard part) is follow through.

The Godzilla Principle: Baby monsters are easier to kill than the full-grown variety. Some solutions come with expiration dates.

If a job's worth doing, it's worth doing badly. That's why we practice what we care about: we start bad, then work up.

Models aren't true or false; they're useful or not useful. A map of Chicago may well be accurate, but in New York City it's not very useful.

Inertia, friction, and entropy are universal: they affect people and organizations as well as physical objects.

Think "both-and" instead of "either-or." People want seemingly opposite things all the time. Often, they achieve them.

Friends and Enemies

Map the political environment around you by identifying allies, opponents, neutrals, fellow travelers, and enemies.

Two factors determine how people treat you: (a) the quality of the relationship and (b) the degree of common interest.

Allies have common interests and a good relationship, so they tend to win when you win. Use them wisely.

Opponents have conflicting interests, but a good relationship. They're valuable; always treat them with respect and fairness.

Fellow travelers have a common interest but a poor relationship. Trust them only as far as their own self-interest takes them.

Enemies have conflicting interests and a poor relationship. Negotiate interests in the short term; build relationships over time.

Neutrals shade in all four directions. Some are best left on the fence; others need to be lured into the game.

Dobson’s Laws of Project Management and Other Things (Part 4)

http://xkcd.com/951/

I’ve been writing and publishing daily management tweets since August 2009. In March 2010, I published a collection of the ones I’d written to that date. Here is the second of three more installments, covering Dobson’s Laws from the beginning of April 2010 through the end of December 2010. Copyright © 2012 by Michael Dobson under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license. 

• 
No matter how vital your mission, you’re never the only game in town. What else is competing for your resources?

• 
The problem isn’t following the crowd; the crowd is often right. The problem is following the crowd *mindlessly*.


• Don’t underestimate the value of accidents. Accidents gave us penicillin, vulcanized rubber, and PostIt® notes.


• 
One of the top mental illnesses is OPD: Obnoxious Personality Disorder. Have you checked yourself for warning signs lately?

• 
Looking for evidence you’re wrong is harder than looking for evidence you’re right, but potentially much more valuable.


• Constraints can be tight or loose, flexible or inflexible. Here are 3 things to do with restrictive constraints: 

1. Negotiate. Is there more money, more time, or flexibility in the deliverables?
 
2. Analyze assumptions. Does the Miami customer really need the item to work in -30° weather?
 
3. Be creative. Is there an alternate way to get the job done?

• There’s always a question that if asked early enough will reveal what’s about to happen. Maybe you can figure out how to ask it next time.

• If you don't know where you’re going, hard work won’t get you there.


• 
Life is like baseball. If you’re batting 1.000, you’re not playing in the major leagues.


• 
If you need to take big risks in order to achieve your objective, it’s a good idea to minimize the cost and consequence of failure.


• 
People always tell the truth...especially when they lie. We choose our lies, so they speak volumes about us — if you know how to listen.


• 
If people are involved, the shortest distance between two points is *never* a straight line.

• The physics of organizations — Friction. When moving parts interface, friction reduces efficiency and creates waste heat. Lubrication is necessary.


• 
The physics of organizations — Entropy. All systems are entropic; they move from order toward chaos unless outside energy is applied.


• The physics of organizations — Inertia: People at rest tend to stay at rest unless acted upon by an outside force. Once they move, they keep moving, at least until friction and entropy grind them down.

• 
Annoyance is another mother of invention.


• 
Unpleasant processes can bring desirable results...but wouldn’t it be great if being fit and slim didn’t require diet or exercise?


• 
Unless you have an education or do the research, you do not have an educated opinion on the subject.


• 
Research suggests that stupid people think they are smarter than they are, and smart people think they are less smart. How smart did you say you were again?

• Those who can, do. Those who cannot make better teachers, because they understand why you are having trouble.


• One dimension of creativity is the willingness to bellyflop in public and then do it over again.


• 
Forgiving your enemies is one of the most selfishly valuable things you can do. Let go of the negative emotion...but remember their names.


• 
Pessimists see the world more clearly, but optimists tend to live longer and make more money.


• 
The average IQ is 100. Two-thirds of the population have IQs between 80 and 120. Be patient, be generous, and be unsurprised. 


• 
We associate age with wisdom, but age only provides experience. Wisdom is optional.


• 
Dare to be stupid. Smart people know better than to color outside the lines.

• It is better to give than to receive, but receiving is pretty cool, too.


• 
The majority of people try to be decent and honest within the limits of their ability and understanding. Be generous as well as prudent.


• 
Generosity pays. The more you give, the more you get, in surprising and varied ways.


• 
Four dimensions of a risk: 

1. Goodness - People equate risk with threat, but events can be beneficial or harmful. Sometimes you can choose.
  
2. Impact - What it means to *you.* The net impact of a risk (good or bad) often depends on how you play it.
3. Probability - When impact is variable, there is usually a lesser chance of a greater impact.
 
4. Time - What we knew yesterday is different from what we will know tomorrow. Risks and choices are not static.

• Risk taker? Risk avoider? A false distinction. We all embrace risk in some areas of our lives and eschew it in others.


• Stakeholders often create project risk for you by the act of offloading their own risk.


• 
The end of the technical work is not the end of the project. Turnover and closeout are often fraught with risk; plan for them.


• 
Three pillars of civilization: economic development, universal education, and a commitment to treat people better than they deserve.


• 
Zero-sum games only rearrange things: the same number of poker chips leave the table, only in different pockets. Winners require losers.
 
Non-zero-sum games can create or destroy value. If I want your stuff more than I want my money, and you feel the opposite, we both win.
 Common sense makes people think most games are zero-sum. The opposite is almost always true — there *is* such a thing as a free lunch. The zero-sum mindset is a trap. Assume opportunity...and then look for it.


• What is half of thirteen? Six and a half is one right answer, but so is *thir.* Many questions have more than one right answer.


• 
Picasso was once asked what it felt like to be a great artist. He drew a sketch on a $1 bill. “Now it is $1000,”he said.


• “Picasso, draw things as they really look, like this photo of my wife!” said the drunk. Picasso said, “Your wife? She seems rather small. And flat.”

• *Can* does not imply *should.* But it definitely implies *will.*

• It is highly improbable that nothing highly improbable will happen.

• 
Your mind is designed to cope with life in the Stone Age. This means your first reaction is often the opposite of what it needs to be. 


• 
For every problem, there is a simple, clear, and straightforward answer. It is almost certainly wrong.

• You don’t know how good you’ve got it until you can’t get at it.


• To paraphrase Holmes, when all better options have been foreclosed, whatever remains, no matter how rotten, is your solution set.


Dobson's Laws (Part 2)

Herewith another collection of my daily SideWise Insights. Enjoy — and be sure to drop them into casual conversation.

Leadership and Motivation

Leadership skills are not fungible. Eisenhower was a great leader; Patton was a great leader; neither could have done the other's job.

While it's useful to tame what can be tamed, most of the management world lives where the wild things are.

The Old Yeller Rule: you have to know when and how to shoot your own dog. Sometimes it's even an act of mercy.

Realism isn't cynicism. A cynic is disappointed that things are what they are. Realists accept the facts and go from there.

It's not enough to learn the lessons an event teaches; you have to *not* learn the lessons it *doesn't* teach.

If someone spends more time and energy scheming to get out of work than it would take to do it, is that person unmotivated?

In the same way expenses rise faster than income, so does responsibility rise faster than authority.

Competition imposes constraints that aren't under your control. This suggests that a portion of your resources be devoted to intelligence.

You have to pay people to get them to work: you personally, not the organization. Respect, gratitude, and support make great paychecks.

"Lessons learned" aren't pleasant, but they're essential for growth. Make watching the game film as pleasant as possible.

There are two very different reasons to delegate: (a) to get stuff off your desk and (b) to train other people. Do some of each every week.

Another proud graduate of the Blanche Dubois School of Leadership: "We rely on the kindness of strangers!"

The job of leaders is making bad decisions, not good ones. When all options are rotten, the decision goes up the ladder.

When I first became a supervisor, I was so naive I actually believed my title meant people would do what I said.

Work is infinite. Resources are finite. Many management problems derive from this essential truth.

Operational definition of quality: It ain't dog food if the dog don't eat it. If no customer or boss wants it, why is it a requirement?

Power and Politics

Your role power is delegated by other people, but your respect power is something you own personally.

Here's a simple test to see if you have office politics in your organization: Do a headcount. If the result is 3 or higher, the answer is yes.

Power is energy that overcomes resistance to achieve work. The corollary of no power = no work.

The power to say "no" is held at lower organizational levels than the power to say "yes." Don't ask someone whose only answer is negative.

If there are multiple stakeholders, the 500 lb. gorilla wins. If there's more than one 500 lb. gorilla, conflict is inevitable.

Your negotiation power is greatest right before you say "yes." As soon as you've said it, your power plummets.

Pick your fights carefully. Some are necessary, some even desirable, but others should be avoided at all costs.

If you tell people they can have what they want, you're a genius. Tell them "no," you're a moron. Spin your "no" so it sounds like "yes."

If the wasps are already swarming, maybe you shouldn't be riling them up even more.

Military retreats don't garner kudos, but managing one takes a lot of planning. If you expect cutbacks, don't wait for the announcement.

Power follows failure like white corpuscles follow disease. Look for the last major failure to find out which department is most powerful.

Keep your friends close, and your customers closer. You need to manage them.

Project Management and Risk Management

Organizational movement up and down the stovepipe is easier; unfortunately, project managers usually need to work sideways.

A project begins life as a gap between where you are and where you want to be. If the project doesn't close the gap, it's a failure.

There are three main project gaps: the official gap, the underlying gap, and one or more hidden agendas. You need to know them all.

All wars are projects, though not all projects are wars. Borrow the best military thinking, but don't confuse problems with actual enemies.

It's not just one damn thing after another, it's usually the same damn thing over and over again. Attack repetitive crises at the roots.

In spite of a quarter-century of project management professionalism, studies show nearly 70% of all projects fail...and the trend is getting worse.

It's well known project management needs to be scaled, but it also needs to be stretched.

Two reasons projects fail: stuff nobody expected and didn't prepare for, and stuff everybody expected...and didn't prepare for.

Success at the project level doesn't mean success at the program level. "The operation was a success, but the patient died."

It's often an advantage to organize your project in stages. Actual results build enthusiasm and commitment.

Identify bad projects early by looking at stakeholder interests and conflicts. Are you being set up as the scapegoat for inevitable failure?

What makes a project challenging? Complexity, constraints, and (un)certainty. Of them, uncertainty is the toughest to manage.

Megaprojects inevitably have megaproblems. Take scale and complexity into account before judging disaster too harshly.

Some objectives are easier to achieve then others, even if they aren't central. It's often smart to pick low-hanging fruit.

Hidden or unstated objectives may be politically sensitive, and can't be spoken out loud without creating problems.

Some key goals are assumed, not stated, but that doesn't mean you're off the hook. Listen carefully to what people don't say.

"Nothing's impossible" implies unlimited resources and time and really flexible performance goals. None of these apply to project managers.

Earning a PMP only means you know the basics. No one ever finishes learning to be a good project manager.

A risk evaluation prices a risk, but price alone doesn't always tell you whether the risk is worth running.

There is no reliable correlation between short-term and long-term outcomes. Bad early can be great later, and vice versa.

If you do something stupid and get lucky, it doesn't validate the quality of your original decision.

Don't drive carpet tacks with a sledgehammer. Most formal systems are way too robust for most normal projects.

The most overlooked question is "Why?" If you don't know, even if you're on time, on budget, and to spec, you haven't done the job.

All wars are projects, but not all projects are wars. Wars have conscious opponents. Don't confuse ordinary risk with actual malice.

You are never the only game in town. What other projects are going on? How's the overall organization's health? Adjust accordingly.

The project isn't necessarily what they tell you it is. It isn't necessarily even what they think it is. Your job is to figure out what it really is.

Projects live in a finite universe, bounded by the triple constraints of time, cost, and performance.

The triple constraints of time, cost, and performance are never equally constraining. What drives your project? What is most flexible?

On any project, make sure you know where "good enough" is. Even Tiger Woods needs to know what par is.

Why People Don’t Do What You Want

Performance problem come in three varieties: "don't know," "can't do," or "won't do." Each has a different solution.

"Don't know" problems are communications failures. Don't expect your team to perform the Vulcan mind meld.

"Can't do" problems may require training, tools, someone else, or you may have to change what you're asking.

"Won't do" problems are about motivation. Everyone's motivated. Some work harder to get out of work than it would take to do it.

There are three reasons for a “Won’t Do”:

If performance is punished (reward for a bad project is an even worse one), expect motivation to drop quickly.

If failure is rewarded (screw up a job, get an easier one), expect failure.

If performance doesn't seem to matter, people put it on the bottom of the "to do" list, as they should.

Whenever someone isn't doing what you want, remember there are only these three reasons: don't know, can't do, and won't do.

Copyright © 2010 Michael Dobson, and made freely available under the Creative Commons attribution license.

Six Skills for Managing Your Boss

I didn’t learn to appreciate the art of managing up until I first had the experience of managing down. One of the common surprises a new manager experiences is how much time you spend doing things for your employees. And when it comes to your employees doing things for you—well, I was so naïve when I first became a supervisor I actually thought that meant that people would do what I said.

How quickly we learn.

When I talk about “managing up,” people often think that’s something you do to your boss, that the goal is for the employee to get power over the boss. But that’s not the case. “Managing up” is something you do for your boss, and if you’re the boss, it’s something you wish more of your employees knew how to do.

At work—and at home, for that matter—we live inside a tightly woven web of mutual obligations. If you’re the boss, your employees are obligated to do certain work for you. And you normally have obligations in return: you review and approve and advise and decide. You go to bat. You run interference. You receive the passed buck. And occasionally you call for a Hail Mary play.

You have a similar relationship with your own boss, and he or she with his or her, and so ad infinitum. And that’s not even getting into the more complicated lateral relationships that cut across organizational boundaries.

Management, in a nutshell, is getting work done through the agency of other people. Whether those people actually report to you is largely irrelevant. You have to manage in three dimensions: up, down, and sideways. The official power you get as a supervisor or manager is never adequate to the task at hand. Ultimately, we’re all Blanche DuBois, from Tennessee Williams’ A Streetcar Named Desire: we rely on the kindness of strangers.

We had better be good at it.

A few years ago, my wife Deborah and I researched and wrote a series of three books on the practical challenges of the workplace: Coping With Supervisory Nightmares, Enlightened Office Politics, and Managing UP! As we interviewed managers on what worked and what didn’t, we also looked back on our own careers. We had learned most of these lessons the hard way ourselves, many of them imperfectly, and more than a few we had missed altogether.

While the target audience of the book was new supervisors, we quickly learned that higher ranks of leadership were far more interested in the skills we had identified. That’s because we feel the need most keenly because we’re also on the other side.

Of course, you’ve long since learned the basics, but like us, you probably acquired your knowledge the way the cat learned to swim—by being thrown into the deep end. Even more importantly, you’ve learned what’s at stake.

Managing up isn’t just about taking care of your personal career, although it does. Managing up is the missing link in the relationships you need to run a large, complex organization in today’s crisis-prone environment.

SELF

To manage up effectively, you have to start with yourself and move outward. The first issue, the first rung on the ladder of MANAGING UP, is you: the self. A big part of your success in managing others, in whatever direction, comes from your own fundamentals: the quality of your work; the value of your word; and the content of your character

STYLE

From the inward self, we move outward to style: our own and that of others. None of us checks our humanity at the door when we clock in. For better and for worse, human beings have personalities, preferences, and interests. Friction is unavoidable. Without lubrication, the machine grinds, and eventually freezes.

SUBSTANCE

Style without substance, however, is insufficient. We begin our rise up the management ladder by demonstrating technical merit. But we quickly discover that there’s no such thing as a promotion, not really. Instead, each level is a career change, and we have to discover for ourselves what we need to be successful at the next level. The current age requires continuous learning: what do you need to know next? Where do you need to grow?

SYSTEMS

We can’t do it alone. We need systems in order to function effectively. Leaders are necessarily generalists; the higher you go the wider the set of skills and knowledge you need. Eventually you need to know everything, and that’s impossible. We feel we’re stuck in the Peter Principle trap, promoted to the level of our incompetence. But we can pull ourselves out. There are two ways out. Sometimes we have to acquire new skills and knowledge…or else we have to manage others to provide the work we need.

SYNERGY

The word of the day is “team,” because none of us, it is said, is as smart as all of us. Sadly, sometimes the opposite is also true. Nothing is dumber than groupthink gone wild. The real synergy involves balancing the wisdom of the team with the wisdom of the individual. If “there is no ‘I’ in ‘team,’” it’s equally true that “you can’t spell ‘team’ without ‘m-e.’"

SOLVING PROBLEMS

General rules will take us only so far. We have to apply our skills tactically as well as strategically. Managers manage problems as well as people—not to mention problem people—up, down, and sideways. Some bosses are harder to manage than others, and some live up to the old observation that “BOSS” spelled backwards is “double SOB.”

In an ideal world, you want your work environment to have certain characteristics, from the level of challenge and responsibility you desire to how you want to balance the demands of the office and the home. It's unlikely that happy accident alone will achieve what you want. Take responsibility for managing the relationship between you and your boss, you and your peers, and you and your worklife. You'll be much better off.

Risk Management, Cognitive Bias, and the Global Warming Debate

The debate on global warming tends to revolve completely around the science. Is it good? Is it bad? Is it meaningful? Is it corrupt? Everyone has an opinion on the quality of the science, and once those opinions are formed, they’re almost impossible to shake.

A wide variety of potential cognitive biases complicate the picture. Notice there’s enough here for everybody — no one’s being singled out.

• Base rate fallacy — ignoring statistical data in favor of particulars

• Confirmation bias — interpreting information to confirm your preconceptions

• Experimenter’s bias — with about sixty subsets

• Focusing effect — putting too much emphasis on a single aspect of a situation or event

• Framing — viewing through a perspective or approach that is too narrow

• Hyperbolic discounting — the preference for more immediate payoffs over the long term

• Irrational escalation — making irrational decisions based on rational decisions in the past, or to justify actions already taken

• Information bias — seeking more information even when it cannot affect action or decision

…the list goes on. Recognize some of these biases? If you’re like most of us, you recognize them in the other side more than you see them in yourself or those who agree with you.

Part of the reason why cognitive bias is at work is that the question isn’t really clear. We’re all arguing about the science, though few of us are truly entitled to an educated opinion on the subject.

But what’s the question?

It’s not about whether a scientific opinion is correct or incorrect. That sort of thing only interests specialists. No, the question has to do with what (if anything) should we do about it, based on the potential cost and consequences.

In other words, it’s a question of risk management. And to the extent that it’s a question of risk management, it’s phrased wrong.

A risk, as you’ll remember, is a future event with some probability of happening that if it happens will have a meaningful impact on your situation. If the impact is negative, it’s a threat. If the impact is positive, it’s an opportunity.

Risks, like Gaul, can be divided into three parts. The first part is probability. How likely is it that the risk will happen?

The second part is impact. If the risk should happen, what would be its effects?

Those two parts combine in the formula R = P x I to calculate a risk score, the value of the risk.

We care about the value of the risk because that helps us make a rational decision about the third element: the cost of reducing or eliminating the negative risk, or the cost of obtaining or exploiting the positive risk.

Probability

The argument about the science of climate change is at root an argument about probability. The process of science involves collecting data, discovering patterns in that data, and developing and testing hypotheses and theories about that data. Over time, the process of peer review creates a consensus in the scientific community, and at any moment in time, that’s the state of scientific knowledge.

Let’s sidestep the discussion about whether the consensus of current scientific knowledge is accurate or inaccurate, and merely assess how our own feeling and opinions influence our judgment of probability. Taking as a guide the legal standards of proof, we might fall somewhere on the following spectrum. For a rough calculation, I’ve put in some percentages.

Degree of Belief (Probability You Think It's True)

True beyond any doubt (99+%)

True beyond a reasonable doubt (95%)

True by the preponderance of the evidence (75%)

Unable to tell (50%)

False by the preponderance of the evidence (25%)

False beyond reasonable doubt (5%)

False beyond any doubt (>1%)

This is about what you believe about the science, and a corresponding figure that relates to how likely it is that the threat is true. If you don't like the choices, add one of your own and choose your own probability number.

Notice that the evidence won't stand still. Over time, science will inevitably get better, regardless of your perspective. Either the evidence of catastrophic global climate change will mount so high no sane person can deny it, or global warming will become the Comet Kohoutek of crises, a non-event. Or maybe something in between.

The problem is by the time the facts become incontrovertible, the moment for decision will have passed. If we guess wrong, there are two possibilities: (a) we will be in a significantly worse position to deal with the resultant impact, or (b) we will have wasted significant resources.

Impact

This leads us to the second item, the question of impact. Impact is the effect of the threat or opportunity if it happens — even if you believe the chance is remote at best. So we have to set probability aside temporarily. We’ll come back to it in a moment.

In addition to arguments about how likely it is that the scientific consensus on global warming is in fact correct, there is a range of opinion as to what that means in practical terms: a range of impact. I've specified a set of potential impact levels and set costs for each. Remember, the issue isn't whether these are going to happen. They're simply descriptions of the potential level of impact that different parties suggest are possible.

So choose from the list below. What, in your opinion, is the worst possible potential outcome if global warming happens?

• Catastrophic. Global warming effects will kill tens or hundreds of millions of people directly and indirectly, wipe out tens of thousands of species, and be an economic and social catastrophe to those who survive. Repair or rebuilding may or may not be possible. (Cost = $Quadrillions)
• Serious. Major weather events, such as hurricanes and tsunamis will be more prevalent, tens and hundreds of thousands will die, economies will suffer. (Cost = $Trillions)
• Moderate. Managing environmental issues will be a consuming issue, but better management and improved technology will make this a background costs. (Cost = $Billions)
• Minor. Insignificant costs. (Cost < $Millions)

Notice the impact could also be positive.

Value of the Risk

Just because you aren't convinced the evidence in favor of a risk is certain doesn't mean you don't act on it. We take everyday precautions to avoid low probability or highly uncertain risks with potentially high impact all the time — every time we drive on a freeway, for example. But there's a limit. How does the value of the risk compare to the cost of mitigation?

The value of the risk, as we’ve noted, is the probability times the impact. From our earlier work, we can construct this table. The risk score in each case is what you should reasonably be willing to spend if necessary to mitigate the degree of risk you personally believe is present.

Catastrophic

95% confident, $Quadrillions

75% confident, $Low Quadrillions

50% confident, $1 Quadrillion

25% confident, $High trillions

5% confident, $Low trillions

Serious

95% confident, $Up to 1 Quadrillion

75% confident, $750 trillion

50% confident, $500 trillion

25% confident, $250 trillion

5% confident, $50 trillion

Moderate

95% confident, $Up to 1 Trillion

75% confident, $750 billion

50% confident, $500 billion

25% confident, $250 billion

5% confident, $50 billion

Minor

95% confident, $Possibly a few billion

75% confident, $Less than a billion

50% confident, $500 million

25% confident, $250 million

5% confident, $Low millions

Cost of Mitigation

The value of the risk is what you’re willing to spend if necessary. Depending on how you assessed probability and impact, you ended up with some amount of money (perhaps $0) that's appropriate as a maximum to spend on the risk.

Of course, you need to compare that to the cost of mitigating or eliminating the risk. Sometimes, it’s not worth it. If I offered to save you from a $1,000 risk in exchange for $2,000, it’s not much of a deal. In general, if the cost of getting rid of the risk exceeds the cost of living with it, you’re better off living with it.

On the other hand, if I can save you from a $1,000 risk (say, a 25% chance of losing $4,000) for only $500, that's a pretty good deal. If the risk happens, you've saved $3,500. But if the risk doesn't happen, you're still out $500.

It's true that not all costs of a risk (or costs of a risk mitigation) can be easily translated into dollar terms — or even should be. That doesn’t change the basic principle, though: the cost of dealing with the risk has to be less than the cost of living with the risk.

There’s an important qualification when it comes to risk mitigation. Some risks you can get rid of altogether if you’re willing to pay the price. Other risks you can reduce, but not eliminate. You can lower the probability of the event occurring, or you can lower the impact if it should occur.

That’s not a bad thing, mind you, but you have to take into account the residual risk when deciding if the strategy is worth it. The value of that risk is the difference between the cost of the original risk and the cost of the residual risk.

The Right Question

To have a reasoned discussion on the subject of global warming, you have to figure out where you are on five issues, not merely one.

1. How correct is the scientific consensus on global warming?

2. What is the impact of global warming if it should occur?

3. What is the value of the risk (probability times impact)?

4. What is the cost of mitigating or eliminating the risk, and how much residual risk would remain?

5. In balance, what level of action on global warming (if any) is warranted?

To change someone’s opinion, you have to change that person’s evaluation of at least one of these issues.

As people on all sides have found, it’s nearly impossible to change anyone’s evaluation of the quality of science, which is our probability benchmark. There’s often more consensus of what global warming might mean if it happens, which is why it’s so important to separate discussion of probability from the discussion of impact.

But the real opportunity has to do with the issue of cost. The best current framing of the debate comes from the argument that dealing with global warming and environmental issues can be relatively low in cost, or ideally profitable.

If the cost to deal with global warming is low enough, it's a good idea even for those who think the probability is low.

He Must Have Deserved It (Part 11 of Cognitive Biases)

Do people always get what they deserve? Would you sooner get a $5 discount or avoid a $5 surcharge? If you get 99 heads in a row, are the odds of another head 50/50? Do you like the familiar? Is everything more expensive these days?

In this installment of Cognitive Biases, we'll cover the just-world phenomenon, loss aversion, the ludic fallacy, the mere exposure effect, and the money illusion.

The illustration is by Gustav Doré from the Book of Job.

Just-world phenomenon

“He must be wicked to deserve such pain,” wrote Robert Browning in “Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came,” and indeed the idea that people get what they deserve, both for good and evil goes back through history. When Job was suffering, his friends Bildad, Zophar, and Eliphaz each argued that Job must have done something wrong, because God would not visit such terrible punishments on an innocent.

The cognitive bias known as the just-world phenomenon refers to the tendency of people witnessing an otherwise inexplicable injustice to look for reasons the victim might have deserved it. In theology, the problem of evil falling on the apparently innocent is known by the all-too-apt name of theodicy.

It’s been demonstrated scientifically as well. In one study, researchers gave women what appeared to be painful electric shocks while working on a difficult memory problem. Other women of broadly the same age and social group who observed the experiment appeared to blame the victim for her fate, praised the experiment, and rated her as being less physically attractive than did those who had seen her but not the experiment.

In another study, female and male subjects were told two versions of a story about an interaction between a woman and a man. Both variations were exactly the same, except at the very end the man raped the woman in one and in the other he proposed marriage. In both conditions, both female and male subjects viewed the woman's (identical) actions as inevitably leading to the (very different) results.

The rain, it is said, falls on the just and unjust alike. Don’t make negative assumptions about people you don’t even know.

Loss aversion

Would you sooner get a $5 discount, or avoid a $5 surcharge? It’s the same $5 either way, but depending on the frame, there’s a dramatic difference in consumer behavior. Some studies suggest that the value of avoiding a loss is psychologically twice as powerful as the value of a gain. In one study of consumer reaction to price changes to an insurance policy, a price increase had twice the effect on customer switching as did a price decrease.

Loss aversion also plays into “sunk cost” bias. If you’ve been gambling and you’re in the hole, it’s the tendency to keep playing in hopes of recovering the lost money. The refusal to admit mistakes is part of loss aversion. The more time and energy you’ve committed to a particular course of action, the harder it is to walk away from it, regardless of the evidence.

Ludic fallacy

If you’ve flipped a coin 99 times and gotten heads each time, what are the odds of getting heads on the next flip of the coin? We’ve already learned about the gambler’s fallacy, so we know the odds of the next flip coming up heads are still 50/50.

But wait a minute. If you’ve flipped a coin 99 times and gotten heads each time, wouldn’t you start to suspect there was something wrong with the coin? The ludic fallacy (a term coined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his 2007 book The Black Swan) is the assumption that messy situations in the real world fall neatly into the models of games and dice.

There’s a lot of value in simplifying a complex problem to identify core principles, but there’s a strong risk of believing the simple model is identical to the messy real world, and that’s wrong. Theory and models are subordinate to reality, not superior to it.

Mere exposure effect

People tend to develop a preference for things merely because they are familiar with them. In studies of interpersonal attraction, the more often a person is seen by someone, the more pleasing and likeable that person appears to be.

When subjects were exposed to an unfamiliar stimulus in laboratory experiments, they reacted to it more positively than other, similar stimuli which had not been presented. In one variation, subjects were shown an image on a tachistoscope for a very brief duration that could not be perceived consciously. This subliminal exposure produced the same effect, though it is important to note that subliminal effects are generally weak and unlikely to occur without controlled laboratory conditions.

The effect is strongest when unfamiliar stimuli are presented briefly. Mere exposure typically reaches its maximum effect within 10-20 presentations, and some studies even show that liking may decline after a longer series of exposures. For example, people generally like a song more after they have heard it a few times, but many repetitions can reduce this preference. A delay between exposure and the measurement of liking actually tends to increase the strength of the effect. Curiously, the effect is weaker on children, and for drawings and paintings as compared to other types of stimuli. One social psychology experiment showed that exposure to people we initially dislike makes us dislike them even more.

Money illusion

“I asked for a three-penny loaf,” wrote Benjamin Franklin about his first day in Philadelphia in 1723, “and was told they had none such. So not considering or knowing the difference of money, and the greater cheapness nor the names of his bread, I made him give me three-penny worth of any sort. He gave me, accordingly, three great puffy rolls. I was surpriz’d at the quanity, but took it, and, having no room in my pockets, walk’d off with a roll under each arm, and eating the other.”

When this story was first presented to me in school, the teacher and students discussed how cheap bread must have been in those days. A loaf for a penny! But, of course, that’s not true. The average weekly wage was about a dollar, meaning a penny represented about half an hour’s worth of work. Today, the median personal income for a 25 year old with a bachelor’s degree is about $50,000, and (I just checked) you can buy a loaf of white bread for $1.00 at the local store. That means bread costs about 3 minutes worth of work, or a tenth as much as Benjamin Franklin paid.

Has gas gotten more expensive? In 1958, gas cost 24¢ a gallon, but that’s $2.24 in current terms. How about postage? In real terms, a first class stamp today costs less than it did in the 1940s, when it hit an inflation-adjusted spike of 51¢ (4¢).

The face value of money isn’t as important as its purchasing power, but psychologically, people don’t believe it. If you get a 2% pay cut, it’s unfair and hugely damaging to morale. But if inflation is 4% and you get a 2% raise, you’re in exactly the same position, but you’re more likely to think you’re being treated well.

Previous Installments

Part 1 — Bias blind spot, confirmation bias, déformation professionnelle, denomination effect, moral credential effect.

Part 2 — Base rate fallacy, congruence bias, experimenter’s bias

Part 3 — Ambiguity aversion effect (Ellsberg paradox), choice-supportive bias, distinction bias, contrast effect

Part 4 — Actor-observer bias, anchoring effect, attentional bias, availability cascade, belief bias

Part 5 — Clustering illusion, conjunction fallacy, cryptomnesia

Part 6 — Disposition effect, egocentric bias, endowment effect, extraordinarity bias

Part 7 — False consensus effect, false memory, Forer effect, framing, fundamental attribution error

Part 8 — Gambler’s fallacy, halo effect

Part 9 — Hawthorne effect, herd instinct, hindsight bias, hyperbolic discounting

Part 10 — Illusion of asymmetric insight, illusion of control, illusory superiority, impact bias, information bias, ingroup bias, irrational escalation,

“Looking for the Pony” — Cognitive Biases, Part 2

Welcome back to part two of our discussion of cognitive and decision-making biases. The series begins here.

Everyone's subject to cognitive biases of one sort or another. None of us is capable of pure objectivity; we cannot see reality without distortion. But we can try.

There are around 100 different identified cognitive and decision biases, and some of them have subsets, as we'll see shortly. Today, we'll cover three more: the base rate fallacy, congruence bias, and everyone's traditional favorite, experimenter's bias.

Base rate fallacy. There are 100 terrorists trying to sneak through airline security for every one million non-terrorists. TSA has set up an automated face recognition system that has 99% accuracy. The alarm goes off, and trained Homeland Security agents swoop down. What is the probability their captive is really a terrorist?

Well, if the failure rate is 1%, that means there’s a 99% chance the person is a terrorist, and a 1% chance that he or she is not, right? That justifies a significant assumption of guilt.

But this actually gets it backward. The chance the person isn't a terrorist is far greater — in fact, it's 99.02% likely that the new prisoner is completely innocent!

The mistake that leads to the first conclusion is called the base rate fallacy. It occurs when you don't notice that the failure rate (1 in 100) is the not the same as the false alarm rate. The false alarm rate is completely different, because there are, after all, far more non-terrorists than terrorists. Let's imagine that we walk everyone — 100 terrorist and 1 million non-terrorists, for a total of 1,000,100 people — in front of the face recognition tool. A 1% failure rate means it's going to ring incorrectly one time for each 100 passengers, 10,099 times in total. It will catch 99 terrorists and miss one, but it's also going to catch 10,000 non-terrorists. The ratio is actually 99:10,099, or a miniscule 0.98%, that the person caught is actually a terrorist.

This does not argue against the value of screening. Screening might be perfectly reasonable. Overreaction, however, is not. If you’re 99% sure you’ve caught a terrorist, you will behave differently than if you’re only 1% sure.

To avoid the base rate fallacy, look at the “prior probability.” If there were no terrorists, what would the face recognition system produce? With a 1% failure rate, it would never pick a real terrorist (there would be none), but it would trigger 10,000 false positives. Now you’ve found the missing fact.

(Footnote: Notice that the base rate fallacy only produces incorrect analysis when the scale is unbalanced, as is our case with 100 terrorists in city with a population of 1 million. As the populations approach 50/50, the failure rate and false alarm rate would converge. Mind you, we'd have different problems then.)

Congruence bias. In congruence bias, you only test your hypothesis directly, potentially missing alternative explanations. In the famous Hawthorne experiment, Frederick W. Taylor, father of Scientific Management, wanted to test whether improved lighting in factories would increase worker productivity. He performed a direct test: he measured productivity, installed better lighting, and measured productivity again. Productivity went up. If you are falling into congruence bias, you’re done. Experiment confirmed; case closed.

But Taylor avoided the trap. He tested his hypothesis indirectly. If improved lighting increased productivity, he reasoned that worse lighting should lower it. So he tested that proposition as well. He took out a lot of lights and measured again: and to everyone’s surprise, productivity went up! A deeper analysis revealed what is now known as the Hawthorne Effect: when people feel others are paying attention to them, their productivity tends to go up, at least temporarily. (It’s a huge benefit of management consultants; just by showing up, we’re likely to make things better.)

To avoid congruence bias, don’t be satisfied with direct reasoning alone. Direct confirmation asks, “If I behaved in accordance with my hypothesis, what would I expect to occur?” Indirect confirmation asks, “If I acted in conflict with my hypothesis, what would I expect to occur?” If Taylor had stopped with the first question, we’d all be fiddling with the lights. Only the second question allowed him to discover the deeper truth.

Experimenter’s bias. This bias is well known to anyone in scientific fields. It’s the tendency for experimenters to believe and trust data that agrees with their hypothesis, and to disbelieve and distrust data that doesn’t. It’s a natural enough feeling; there’s a price to pay if we’re wrong, even if it’s only a hit to our egos. It’s impossible for any human being to be completely objective. Our perceptions and intelligence are constrained, and we are looking from the inside, not the outside.

Experimenter’s bias can’t be avoided; it has to be managed instead. Last week, we discussed the “bias blind spot,” the recursive bias of failing to recognize that you have biases. Self-awareness helps. Another good technique is the “buddy system.” I frequently work with co-authors so I have someone to challenge my thinking. That reduces the problem, though it doesn’t eliminate it — wherever my co-author and I see it the same way, the risk remains.

The best technique is to understand the components of the bias. A 1979 study of sampling and measurement biases listed 56 different experimenter’s biases: the “all’s well” literature bias, the referral filter bias, the volunteer bias, the insensitive measure bias, the end-digit preference bias, and my favorite, the data dredging bias, also known as “looking for the pony.”

More next week…

Lead Us Into Temptation (Part 16 of Cognitive Biases)

Our survey of cognitive biases has reached the letter "R," and today we'll look at reactance, the tendency to do the opposite of whatever you're told; the reminiscence bump, the tendency to remember some parts of your life more vividly than others; restraint bias, the idea that we can resist temptation; and rosy retrospection, the tendency to remember the past as better than it is.


Reactance


Reactance is the bias to do the opposite of whatever you’re being pushed to do. It’s the impulse to disobey, to resist any threat to your perceived sense of autonomy. Reactance is what happens when you feel your freedom is threatened.

What turns it into a bias is when the reactance leads you to act in ways contrary to your own self-interest. Get pushed hard enough to get a good job and make some money, and you may ruin a big interview just to show you won’t be pushed around.

There are four stages to reactance:

• Perceived freedom. Something we have the physical capability to do, or refrain from doing. This can be anything imaginable.
• Threat to freedom. A force that is attempting to limit your freedom. This doesn’t have to be a person or group, again, it can be anything. People react against the laws of physics all the time.
• Reactance. An emotional pressure to resist the threat and retain the freedom.
• Restoration of freedom. This can be either direct (you win), or indirect (you lose, but you continue resistance or shift the area of battle).

There are some rules to this. A pretty obvious one is that the magnitude of the reactance grows depending on the importance of the freedom in question. The magnitude of the reactance also grows when a wider swath of freedoms are threatened, even if individually they’re less important. And the magnitude of the reactance depends not only on the freedoms being threatened today, but on the implied threat to future freedom loss.

Lowering the degree of reactance is the degree to which you feel the infringement of your freedom is justified and legitimate. Less confrontational approaches lower reactance in other people.

Reminiscence Bump

Another cognitive bias is the unequal distribution of memories over a lifespan. We begin with infantile amnesia, the tendency not to remember much before the age of four. We remember something of our childhoods, but we recall more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than anything before or after, except for whatever happened most recently.

Besides personal events, the reminiscence bump affects the temporal distribution of public events (where were you when JFK was shot/the Challenger exploded/the Towers fell?), favorite songs, books and movies. It’s why, after all these years, I still can’t forget the lyrics to Herman’s Hermits “Henry VIII.”

Restraint Bias

“Lead us not into temptation,” says the Lord’s Prayer. The restraint bias is the extent to which we tend to overestimate our ability to show restraint in the face of temptation, and as the Lord’s Prayer suggests, we aren’t nearly as good at it as we think we are.

In a recent study at Northwestern’s Kellogg School of Management, researchers studied the effects hunger, drug and tobacco cravings, and sexual arousal had on the self-control process, first by surveying people on their self-assessed capacity to resist temptation, then by actual temptation, and the results showed a substantial overestimation on the part of most people.

This is one of the ways people inadvertently sabotage efforts to change behavior, by overexposing themselves to temptation. Recovering tobacco smokers with more inflated degrees of restraint bias were far more likely to expose themselves to situation in which they would be tempted to smoke, with predictably higher rates of relapse in a four-month period.

Rosy Retrospection

Three groups going on different vacations were interviewed before, during, and after their trips. The typical emotional pattern was initial anticipation, followed by mild disappointment during the trip — and ending up with a much more favorable set of memories some time later!

The cognitive bias of rosy retrospection leads us to compare the present unfavorably when compared to the past, but the difference is that minor annoyances and dislikes, prominent in immediate memory, tend to fade over time.

Once again, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, our gurus of bias, come to the rescue with a technique called reference class forecasting. This corrects for rosy retrospection and other memory biases. Human judgment, they argue, is generally optimistic for two reasons: overconfidence and insufficient consideration of the range of actual likely outcomes. Unless you consider the issue of risk and uncertainty, you have no good basis to build on.

Reference class forecasting for a specific project involves the following three steps:

1. Identify a reference class of past, similar projects.
2. Establish a probability distribution for the selected reference class for the parameter that is being forecast.
3. Compare the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to establish the most likely outcome for the specific project.

The technique has been successful enough that it’s been endorsed by the American Planning Association (APA) and the Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering (AACE).

More next week.

Previous Installments

You can find the bias you’re interested in by clicking in the tag cloud on the right. To find all posts concerning cognitive biases, click the very big phrase.

Part 1 — Bias blind spot, confirmation bias, déformation professionnelle, denomination effect, moral credential effect.

Part 2 — Base rate fallacy, congruence bias, experimenter’s bias

Part 3 — Ambiguity aversion effect (Ellsberg paradox), choice-supportive bias, distinction bias, contrast effect

Part 4 — Actor-observer bias, anchoring effect, attentional bias, availability cascade, belief bias

Part 5 — Clustering illusion, conjunction fallacy, cryptomnesia

Part 6 — Disposition effect, egocentric bias, endowment effect, extraordinarity bias

Part 7 — False consensus effect, false memory, Forer effect, framing, fundamental attribution error

Part 8 — Gambler’s fallacy, halo effect

Part 9 — Hawthorne effect, herd instinct, hindsight bias, hyperbolic discounting

Part 10 — Illusion of asymmetric insight, illusion of control, illusory superiority, impact bias, information bias, ingroup bias, irrational escalation

Part 11 — Just-world phenomenon, loss aversion, ludic fallacy, mere exposure effect, money illusion

Part 12 — Need for closure, neglect of probability, “not-invented-here” (NIH) syndrome, notational bias

Part 13 — Observer-expectancy effect, omission bias, optimism bias, ostrich effect, outgroup homogeneity bias, overconfidence effect

Part 14 — Pareidolia, planning fallacy, post-purchase rationalization

Part 15 — Projection bias, pseudocertainty effect, publication bias